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Abstract
This paper analyses the design of carbon markets in time (intertemporally) and space 
(geographically) from first principles, starting initially with a relatively clean slate and asking 
what an optimal global carbon market would look like by around 2030.  Our focus is on firm-
level trading systems, although much of what we say would also apply to government-level 
trading (e.g., AAU trading under the Kyoto Protocol).  We examine the “first principles” of 
design to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs, consider temporal design including 
banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater carbon price predictability 
and credibility over time, and consider spatial elements, examining the key design issues in 
linking national and regional carbon markets together to create a global carbon market. 
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1 Introduction 
The world is embracing carbon markets. Despite the onset of a global recession, carbon 
trading breached the $100 billion mark in 2008, up from $64 billion in 2007 (Capoor and 
Ambrosi, 2008). Within a decade trading volumes could reach $1 trillion, according to some 
market analysts, at which point the carbon market would start to rival current trading in 
established commodities like oil, gas or gold. As the world embarks on creating a global 
carbon market, this is a good moment to recap the economic case for carbon trading and 
review market design options, as it is important to get the basic structure right. 
The world’s largest carbon market to date is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”), 
which covers over 40% of EU carbon dioxide emissions, or about 2 GtCO2. In December 2008, 
EU member states agreed to extend the scheme until at least 2020 and open it up to new 
sectors, most notably aviation.  Other European countries like Norway, Iceland and 
Switzerland already have or could soon link up with the EU ETS.   
The new US administration wants to make cap-and-trade a key plank of its climate policy.  
The proposals currently contemplated by US lawmakers would create a US-wide carbon 
market within 5-6 years which would be two or three times bigger than the EU ETS. Canada 
has signalled that it might abandon its own carbon trading plans (an efficiency-based system) 
and link up with the US system. Carbon trading in North America started in earnest in January 
2009 with the official launch of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) of 10 north-
eastern States.   
With the two antipodean systems – Australia’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) 
and New Zealand’s Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) – also in different stages of 
development, Japan remains the only major developed economy that is not actively 
considering carbon trading. Even in Japan positions are shifting.  It is not inconceivable that 
the proposal of an OECD-wide market by 2015, advanced by the European Commission in its 
post-2012 communication (European Commission, 2009), could eventually come to pass.   
Last but not least, the expansion and reform of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) — 
the world’s largest baseline-and-credit system — is a key aspect of the international 
negotiations for a new global deal. Negotiators have made it clear that they wish the Kyoto 
mechanisms to continue beyond 2012, but which form they will take is still open to debate.  
Various options to support international carbon finance flows are being actively discussed, 
including sectoral crediting mechanisms which would deliver credits for emission reductions 
from entire sectors, ironing out the remaining wrinkles in programmatic CDM which would 
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permit the credits to be granted for programmes that aggregate many small emission 
reducing activities, and so on (Vivid Economics, 2008; Michaelowa et al., 2008).  
Behind the global interest in carbon markets is the recognition that any meaningful climate 
change policy has to put a price on carbon (Stern 2007).  This is a fundamental, if fairly basic, 
lesson from environmental economics and the theory of externalities (Baumol and Oates, 
1988; Cropper and Oates, 1992).  Environmental economics also tells us that there are several 
ways of putting a price on carbon, including taxes, permits and any number of hybrid 
instruments.  Under textbook assumptions they are essentially equivalent, but in real world 
situations with imperfect information, transaction costs and external shocks, there are 
important differences between trading, taxes and hybrid systems (Hepburn, 2006). 
The key reference on taxes versus permits remains Weitzman (1974), who showed that if 
compliance costs are uncertain the choice of instrument depends on the relative curvatures 
of the marginal benefit curve and the marginal abatement costs curve.  Hoel and Karp (2001) 
and Newell and Pizer (2003) have extended the Weitzman result to stock pollutants such as 
CO2, where damage does not depend on the flow of emissions but on their accumulation in 
the atmosphere.  These papers suggest that a carbon tax is more economically efficient under 
uncertainty than emissions trading.  In practice, however, the Weitzman analysis of efficiency 
under uncertainty has had little influence on the choice of policy instruments.  The preference 
for carbon trading over carbon taxes is driven largely by powerful political economy concerns 
(Hepburn, 2006, 2007).  Trading systems are easier to implement politically.  
Perhaps more important is the fact that in reality the choice between taxes and permits (or 
allowance-based systems) is not strict.  There are ways to create hybrid instruments that 
blend price-based and quantity-based features.  Like all markets, the market for emission 
reductions has a demand schedule, which is determined by the marginal abatement costs of 
regulated agents, and a supply schedule, which is determined by policy. Under a pure tax 
system, the supply of allowances is infinitely elastic. The market is effectively supplied with as 
many allowances as agents wish to buy at a fixed price (the tax rate). Under a pure allowance 
system, supply is completely inelastic as the amount of allowances is exogenously fixed.  
Hybrid systems create a supply curve that is neither fully flat (a pure tax) nor fully vertical 
(pure cap-and-trade) but (stepwise) upward sloping.  It is intuitive to think that hybrid 
instruments, with their conventional supply curve, hold as much promise as the extreme 
cases.  We will return to this later in the report.  The point to note here is that the slope of 
the supply curve is an issue of market design and not predetermined by the choice of 
instrument. 
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The shape of the supply curve is only one of many design choices policy makers have to make.   
Others include: 
 The allocation of allowances creates economic rents and therefore matters a great 
deal to the political viability of any system (Hepburn, 2006).  In many cases 
allocation may also influence the efficiency of the system (Stavins, 1995; Hepburn et 
al., 2006) 
 Links with other instruments are critical for climate policy, because carbon markets 
will inevitably be supplemented by other instruments, so instrument interaction 
matters.  Regulations are often directed at internalising externalities, and the simple 
theory of externalities indicates that only one instrument is needed to internalise 
one externality.  However, several exernalities in addition to the greenhouse gas 
externality are relevant to climate change, including externalities relating to 
innovation and R&D.  These other externalities may be addressed through separate 
policy levers that supplement a price of carbon.  In addition, political distortions 
may imply that even attempts to internalise the carbon price are suboptimal, such 
that carbon prices are well-below the social cost of emissions, supporting the case 
for supplementary interventions to increase coverage or to lift long-term prices.  
 Transaction costs matter with regard to design choice. Some systems are easier to 
administer than others. For instance, upstream trading systems have fewer (and 
more sophisticated) trading entities than, say, downstream trading between 
individual consumers. Another example is that baseline and credit systems, such as 
the Clean Development Mechanism, have inherently higher transaction costs than 
cap and trade systems, because asymmetric information requires costly signalling to 
prove additionality (Vivid Economics, 2008).  
 Temporal issues also matter enormously, given the long-term nature of climate 
change.  The rule on banking and borrowing of allowances within and between 
periods can have strong effects on the liquidity and efficiency of the trading system, 
as the report discusses more extensively in section 3. 
 
It is not the purpose of this report to deal with all of the issues above.  Rather we focus on the 
key issue that makes carbon markets a cost-effective instrument for emission control:  the 
flexibility to spread emission reductions across space and over time.  It is this “where 
flexibility” and “when flexibility” that allows markets to minimise compliance costs.  In 
principle, the more “where” and “when” flexibility is built into market design, the more cost-
effective a market is likely to be.  
However, there are factors that may counsel against full liberalisation of markets across space 
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and time.  For example, different levels of ambition in different jurisdictions may prevent the 
linking of regional markets.  Similarly, most markets limit intertemporal arbitrage — the 
amount of banking and borrowing — to avoid time inconsistency problems. In this report, we 
explore some of these factors and suggest design options that may help to overcome them.  
Woven throughout our arguments will be a second issue: the volatility in the carbon price. 
Undue price fluctuations have been an important concern of policy makers, both upward (e.g. 
the call for safety valves in the US and Australian discussion) and downward (for example the 
recent drop in EU allowance prices and the price collapse in phase I).  We will highlight this 
issue where relevant to other temporal considerations.  In so doing, we distinguish between 
market-induced volatility and volatility resulting from or exacerbated by regulatory design. 
The former is a natural feature of any well-functioning market and may reflect changes in 
underlying fundamentals (for example a change in oil prices). The latter is undesirable and 
should be minimised through appropriate market design. 
Linking markets is one way of reducing regulatory-induced volatility, as price volatility and 
market flexibility are linked.  The more integrated a market is across space and time, the less 
volatile prices should be, all else being equal.  With deeper markets, a shock to any one 
region will have a smaller impact on the global carbon price than it would have had on a 
regional carbon price in an autarkic, smaller market.  While linking to other regions also 
creates exposure to shocks in those other regions, overall market integration might be 
expected to reduce price volatility (Jacks et al., 2009).  In fact, in some cases price volatility is 
a direct consequence of market design and/or policy shocks, rather than being caused by 
natural market fluctuations. 
This report considers the design of carbon markets in time and space from first principles, 
starting initially with a relatively clean slate and asking what an optimal global carbon market 
would look like by around 2030.  Our focus is on firm-level trading systems, although much of 
what we say would also apply to government-level trading (e.g., AAU trading under the Kyoto 
Protocol). Section 2 sets out some “first principles” of design that are woven throughout the 
rest of the report.  In section 3, temporal design elements are considered, including banking 
and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater carbon price predictability and 
credibility over time.  Section 4 turns to spatial elements, examining the key design issues in 
linking national and regional carbon markets together to create a global carbon market. 
Section 5 concludes.  
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2 First principles of carbon market design 
2.1 Maximise “where” and “when” flexibility 
The cost-effectiveness of our efforts to reduce emissions will be critical to the success or 
failure of climate policy, for two reasons.  First, the world’s willingness to pay is limited; there 
are always many worthy claims to attention and funds.  As such, achieving stabilisation of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations at 450-550 ppm will require that the available 
funds are spent wisely.  Second, climate change is such a significant global challenge that (i) 
the costs of reducing emissions are expected to be substantial – at least 1% of GDP (Stern, 
2007; IEA 2007) 1; and (ii) those costs are a strong function of policy choices.  It is thus 
extremely important that the world tackles mitigation in a cost-effective way. 
Costs are reduced by allowing flexibility about where and when emissions reductions occur.  
Integrated assessment modellers have long recognised this.  For instance, in 1996 the 
Stanford Energy Modeling Forum noted that the cost of the then Berlin Mandate (the process 
that resulted in the Kyoto Protocol) could be reduced to a fraction of the total by introducing 
spatial and temporal flexibility (Richels et al. 1996; Manne and Richels, 1996).  This conclusion 
has proven robust to specific models and particular policies (e.g. Vrolijk and Grubb, 1999), as 
indeed would be expected.  A recent example is the work by Edmonds et al. (2008) on the 
cost of delaying developing country participation in the global deal.  Indeed, under certain 
plausible conditions it is theoretically inevitable that providing more options reduces costs.2  
 
                                                           
1
 Of course, it is expected that these costs will be hugely outweighed by the benefits from mitigating 
climate change (Stern, 2007). 
2
 For a study of the relationship between choice and welfare, see Irons and Hepburn (2007).  
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Figure 1 Cost reductions from allowing “where” and “when” flexibility  
 
Source: Richels et al (1996) 
This insight on the value of “where” flexibility is significant.  It suggests that, ceteris parabis, 
our ambition should be a “global” carbon market.  In practice, there are various caveats and 
constraints on implementing such a market, discussed in section 2.2.  Nevertheless, 
something approximating a global carbon market might be created by “linking” different 
national and regional trading systems.  Linking markets not only increases “where” flexibility, 
it also increases liquidity, because there are more willing buyers and sellers, which reduces 
the costs of trading.  In contrast, fragmented and unconnected national carbon trading 
systems would be less liquid, or “thinner”, with concomitantly higher costs of reducing 
emissions.3  
Similarly, theoretical insights on “when” flexibility suggest a market with long-term 
commitment periods, or “phases”, or full scope for banking and borrowing of allowances 
between commitment periods to allow firms to optimise the time at which they reduce 
emissions.  Abatement is generally cheaper if investment coincides with the natural renewal 
cycle of the capital stock. Retrofits or the premature replacement of equipment are 
expensive. Similarly, firms may need “when” flexibility to smoothen out fluctuations in the 
business cycle, manage their debt levels or take advantage of expected innovations.  
The length of the commitment period is important because (i) unlimited banking and some 
                                                           
3
 The new Carbon Reduction Commitment in the United Kingdom may suffer from problems of limited 
liquidity (Defra, 2008). 
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form of borrowing are generally allowed within commitment periods;4 and (ii) there is 
normally clarity about the emissions cap for any given commitment period, but uncertainty 
about emissions cap for future commitment periods.5 
A market with long-term commitment periods and/or banking and borrowing not only 
increases “when” flexibility, it also increases liquidity.  Furthermore, long-term price signals 
would be expected to support stronger innovation that creates new abatement 
opportunities. This has been a source of much recent discussion, with many observers 
questioning the strength of the dynamic signal of the EU ETS (see section 2.2). 
2.2 Constraints prevent a global market  
In reality, there are political and economic constraints preventing a global carbon market 
from emerging. Some of these constraints are not particular to carbon markets.  For instance, 
the “global markets” for oil, wheat and gold are in fact complex trading systems where 
location, quality and time matter. Carbon will most likely be the same, and it would be 
surprising if there were a single, globally uniform carbon price. 
In terms of “where” flexibility, there may be constraints in linking up systems because of: 
(i) inherent differences in the traded good.  For instance, “forest carbon” from 
afforestation or reforestation schemes raises questions of permanence (Eliasch 
2008).   Aviation emissions involve complex scientific issues of radiative forcing at 
altitude, and various other sectors, including agriculture for instance, involve the 
conversion of other greenhouse gases into carbon dioxide equivalents; 
(ii) excessive cost differences.  While the point of emissions trading is to maximise 
“gains from trade” (section 3.1), political considerations demand that transfers are 
not “too large”.  For instance, one of the controversies surrounding HFC projects 
under the CDM was the amount of economic rent generated (Hepburn, 2007).  The 
carbon market was seen as too expensive a way to phase out HFCs, which is 
relatively cheap to do; and   
(iii) policy differences, primarily due to differences in the level of ambition of different 
systems. Differences in ambition manifest themselves in different carbon price 
levels that are deemed unacceptable. 
                                                           
4
 For instance, the EU ETS Phase 2 allows unlimited banking between periods: EUAs of vintage 2008 
may be used for compliance in 2011.  Limited borrowing is allowed in that allowances for 2009 may be 
used for compliance for the 2008 period.   
5
 The EU ETS aims to address this by extending the annual emission reduction target for phase III 
(1.74% p.a.) beyond the end of phase III. However, the target is of course subject to future review. 
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In terms of “when” flexibility, the main constraint is on the extent to which firms can borrow, 
rather than bank, allowances between commitment periods, because: 
(i) the government may not be well-equipped to assess the credit worthiness and 
solvency of firms who borrow allowances, who thereby become debtors; 
(ii) borrowing enables firms to delay action if they assume that targets will prove too 
onerous and will subsequently be softened; 
(iii) firms with borrowed allowances have an active interest to lobby for weaker targets, 
or even for scrapping emissions trading altogether, so that their debts are cancelled. 
(iv) the political desire to (be seen to) act early, and potential benefits of early action, 
also imply that politicians may prefer to place constraints on borrowing. 
 
These concerns about borrowing imply that most trading systems do not allow borrowing 
between commitment periods, and often even limit borrowing within commitment periods.6  
In contrast, banking does not create such difficulties: firms with banked allowances have a 
vested interest in higher prices and the continuation of the system, to maximise the value of 
their allowance assets.  Banking can also prevent a price collapse between commitment 
periods.  For these reasons, most emissions trading systems have allowed banking in some 
form.  A notable exception is phase I of the EU ETS, where banking was not allowed and the 
price duly collapsed at the end of the period. 
When there are limits on borrowing between periods, but some borrowing allowed within 
periods, it follows that the length of the commitment period is relevant to “when” flexibility 
and to market efficiency.  Period length is also relevant when investments to reduce 
emissions require many years for investors to recover their costs (including the cost of 
capital).  If commitment periods are short, investors have to guess the emissions caps set by 
future governments, and attempt to anticipate changes in the underlying structure of the 
carbon trading framework.  These uncertainties significantly increase risk and reduce the 
likelihood of low-carbon investments being made (Helm, Hepburn and Mash, 2003). In 
addition to providing better incentives for innovation, longer commitment periods are 
supported by the most recent science, which suggests that cumulative emission targets to 
2050 provides a more robust approach to limiting the probability of temperature increases 
above 2oC (Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009).  Setting overall long-term targets has 
the additional benefit of leaving the optimal time path of emission reductions to the market, 
                                                           
6
 Individual firms may, of course, borrow allowances from other regulated firms on a bilateral or 
exchange-cleared basis.  But such trades do not threaten the integrity of the system 
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without policy makers needing to second guess the dynamically efficient path.7    
While short commitment periods create problems, they also have benefits.8  Short periods 
leave governments the flexibility to set future caps according to changes in science or in the 
availability of new abatement technologies.  This flexibility has value. However, if 
governments wish to retain the benefits of short commitment periods, other mechanisms are 
likely to be needed to address the shortcomings9 and to provide the private sector with 
appropriate long-term incentives for low-carbon investment.10   
Next we turn to design features that can overcome some of these problems, while 
maintaining “where” and “when” flexibility. 
                                                           
7
 The market will not necessarily provide price signals far into the future. Price formation is hampered 
by increasing uncertainty as forecasts extend further into the future. However, fixing long-term targets 
would nevertheless remove one key aspect of uncertainty. 
8
 A discussion is provided by Hepburn (2006), who notes that the flexibility also brings additional costs, 
one of which is the “hold up” problem created by the fact that the government arguably has an 
incentive to adjust policy to address other objectives ex post firms have sunk resources into irreversible 
low-carbon investment. 
9
 These include potential negative impacts of shorter periods on incentives to invest in longer-term 
low-carbon research and innovation. 
10
 Examples include long-term carbon contracts (Helm and Hepburn, 2008) or issuing put options 
(Ismer and Neuhoff, 2009). 
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3 Spatial design: “where” flexibility 
The first principles of carbon market design point to a theoretical ideal of a global market 
with full “where” flexibility.  Given the geographical distribution of low-cost mitigation 
opportunities (McKinsey 2009), only a global market will ensure full cost-efficiency.  
A truly global carbon market with uniform rules and a global regulatory regime is unlikely to 
emerge for many years. However, a system of connected and coordinated regional markets 
can be an alternative that provides similar efficiency gains. Even established global markets 
like that for oil, wheat or coal are systems of separate but highly integrated regional markets 
with distinct local supply and demand dynamics.  The most likely way in which a global carbon 
market will emerge is through increasingly closer links between regional trading systems. 
Linked markets will create trading opportunities, financial flows and “rents”, or gains from 
trade (section 3.1). Linking regional markets requires a certain level of coordination and the 
alignment of policy objectives between the systems. Perhaps the most important objective 
upon which agreement is required is the range of acceptable carbon prices, as prices in linked 
systems will invariably converge through arbitrage. That is, there has to be an equivalence of 
ambition between systems (section 3.2).  There is also a need for coordination on market 
rules such as allowance allocation, the treatment of offsets and quality standards, e.g. in 
terms of monitoring (section 3.3).  The more integrated a market is, the lower are concerns 
about carbon leakage and the loss of competitiveness. If markets are insufficiently linked and 
“unilateral”, a key concern for market design is how to address leakage and competitiveness 
issues (section 3.4). 
3.1 The gains from trade 
A key feature of integrated markets – and in fact the source of the efficiency gains – is that it 
allows the arbitrage of price differentials until there is a uniform price across the system. 
Figure 2 shows this effect schematically. Emission reductions in the first country (in our 
hypothetical example, the US) are measured from left to right, those of the second country 
(the EU) are measured from right to left.  The width of the graph denotes the combined 
abatement effort.  Before markets are linked up we will observe a different autarky price in 
each system.  Once the two markets are joined up we will observe a net flow of allowances 
from the low-price system (the US in this example) to the high-price system (the EU) until 
there is a uniform price.  Higher marginal abatement costs in the EU means that EU firms find 
it optimal to purchase allowances from US firms instead of reducing emissions at home. 
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Figure 2 Hypothetical gains from linking US and EU trading systems  
 
 
The activity generates economic benefits in the size of the shaded area:  High-cost abatement 
in the EU is replaced with cheaper abatement in the US.  At the firm level, EU firms benefit 
from reduced costs of compliance, and US firms profit from selling their excess allowances at 
higher prices than they would achieve in the domestic US system.  The size of the gains from 
trade depends upon the shape of the marginal abatement cost curves of the trading regions, 
and the respective ambition of the two systems.   
If the linking systems are identical in ambition, such that carbon prices are identical in 
autarky, then there are no immediate gains from trade.  However, there are benefits from 
increased liquidity.  Furthermore, Figure 2 only presents a static analysis; in reality the 
location of the marginal abatement costs will shift as new technologies are discovered, and 
indeed as the market price of other key commodities (such as coal and gas) move.  These 
dynamic movements imply that even systems of roughly equivalent ambition would have 
wide variances in prices without linking between them.  
3.2 Equivalence of ambition 
Linking markets requires that policy makers in both systems have similar levels of ambition 
and expectations about the carbon price.  The equilibrium price Pworld in Figure 2 has to be 
within an acceptable range for both jurisdictions.  
This seems obvious but is in fact the main stumbling block in linking up markets.  The EU more 
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or less explicitly aspires to a high-price system that ultimately supports technologies like 
Carbon Capture and Storage. In much of the rest of the world, most notably the US, the 
concern is more about avoiding price spikes. As long as levels of ambition are not aligned 
regional markets will not be linked for political reasons, and if they were they would function 
badly. 
Imagine a linked up system such as that in Figure 2 where regulators in both systems have the 
ability to intervene in the market.  The following undesirable scenario could occur.  In the 
low-price system, a safety valve or other mechanism might be triggered as arbitrage pushes 
the price up to the equilibrium level (for example, through the issuance of additional 
allowances or increased offset limits). In the meantime, the high-price regulator might seek to 
support the price by withdrawing allowances or imposing an auction reserve price above 
Pworld. The two sets of action will cancel each other out (unless one regulator has more market 
power than the other). In the process they will increase the flow of allowances from the low-
price to the high-price system.  Market intervention exacerbates the ex-ante differences.  The 
low-price system becomes even more low-price (in terms of the autarky price) as the level of 
ambition is scaled down, and the reverse happens in the high-price system. 
A second issue is the acceptance of the financial transfers and trade flows that integration will 
bring. They are depicted graphically in Figure 3. The low-cost system (in our example, the US) 
can expect carbon market revenues in the magnitude of the shaded rectangle. Depending on 
the shape of the abatement cost curves and the levels of domestic ambition, cross-border 
flows may be significant relative to overall trading volumes. For example, in 2008 UK firms 
participating in the EU ETS were 24% over their allowed cap and had to buy a net 50 million 
allowances from firms in other countries.  German firms were 21% short and had to import 84 
million allowances. 11 Combined, these transactions were worth in excess of €2.5 billion.   
This is a small sum relative to overall trade flows. The UK imports goods and services worth 
over €500 billion each year  Nevertheless, the size and direction of trade flows is likely to 
matter when systems are linked up, and particularly when they are caused by differences in 
the level of ambition (a policy choice), rather than abatement costs (a technical-economic 
issue).  Few policy makers will be willing to reward low levels of ambition with additional 
financial flows from carbon market arbitrage. 
                                                           
11
 Data from http://communities.thomsonreuters.com/Carbon/. A fraction of the shortfall may also 
have been borrowed from the 2009 allowance pool (see section 4.1). 
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Figure 3 Hypothetical payments from EU firms to US firms 
 
 
3.3 Compatibility of system design 
Linking trading systems requires a minimum level of coordination on market design or the 
combined markets will not function properly.  We have already seen the impact of differing 
price policies (price support vs. safety valves) in the previous section.  It is not the only area 
where coordination will be necessary (Sterk et al., 2009). 
One major area where consistency across systems is crucial in the longer term is allowance 
allocation.  In isolated markets (and in the early stages of a system) allowances tend to be 
issued for free, particularly to installations that are subject to international competition.  The 
belief is that this can help to mitigate negative impacts on competitiveness.  We will discuss 
the merits of this approach in the next section.  Whatever they may be, they fall away once 
the competition is also capped under a linked emissions trading system and therefore subject 
to the same carbon price.  In that case free allocation becomes a form of state aid that gives 
its recipients a competitive advantage over rivals that have to purchase their allowances.  To 
avoid market distortions, linking up regional systems has to go hand-in-hand with an 
alignment in allocation rules. 
This is the reason why allocation rules within the EU ETS are coordinated at EU rather than 
national level. As a consequence, differences are small (although there are some). The only 
sector where there are substantial differences in allocation rules is electric power, where 
some Central European power producers will enjoy softer auctioning rules than their Western 
peers in phase III of the system.  However, the derogation is temporary and there is relatively 
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little cross-border electricity trading in Europe so the competitiveness effect is small. 
Another area where coordination across systems is important is the treatment of carbon 
offsets, such as certified emission reductions from the CDM. There has to be alignment both 
in terms of the quality (environmental integrity) and the quantity of offsets permitted into a 
system. Most cap and trade systems limit the number of offset credits that can be imported 
into the system. The current version of the Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme is a 
notable exception (Government of Australia, 2008).  Different systems also impose varying 
degrees of quality requirements. The EU ETS, for example, does not recognise forestry 
credits.  Once systems are linked any such differences disappear de facto.  Credits may enter 
the market through the national system with the most permissive rules, where they can be 
swapped into freely tradable allowances.  
3.4 Competitiveness issues 
One of the main questions in designing a unilateral cap-and-trade system is how to prevent 
carbon leakage and the loss of international competitiveness. The two issues are linked.  
Leakage and competitiveness are the environmental and economic side of the same coin.  
Firms facing higher production costs due to carbon regulation are at a disadvantage in the 
international market and will lose market share to competitors with less stringent carbon 
constraints.  Multinational firms may choose to relocate production to avoid carbon 
regulations.  In either case, emissions and economic activity move away from the regulated 
space to less-strictly regulated regions.  Even if this does not happen, mitigation action in the 
regulated market could lead to a fall in the demand of high-carbon fuels like coal, whose price 
will drop as a consequence.  This will in turn stimulate demand (and reduce the cost base) 
outside the regulated market.  The result is again carbon leakage and a loss in 
competitiveness. 
The problem is most acute between regulated and unregulated markets but it applies 
similarly to regions with different carbon prices and different levels of ambition. Most studies 
suggest that competitiveness issues are restricted to a small number of sectors (Carbon Trust 
2008).   Nevertheless it is an important concern. 
Competitive issues become smaller the wider and more integrated the carbon market 
becomes as an increasing share of a sector is covered by equivalent regulation. Linking is 
therefore the first-best-choice of resolving competitiveness problems and preventing leakage.  
If linking is not possible the next best solution is to create a level playing field in those sectors 
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where international competition is particularly strong and the problem thus most acute.  In 
some cases, it may be feasible to create a fully-fledged sector-level trading system. 
International shipping is one sector where this is contemplated.  In other cases it may help to 
impose similar regulatory requirements on firms inside a trading system (through a carbon 
price) and outside the system (through equivalent regulation).  Sector agreements are 
contemplated, for example, in steel.  However, they are difficult to set up because production 
processes and national circumstances differ, which makes it hard to define meaningful 
technical benchmarks.12  Other problems arise, including the challenge of creating incentive 
for participation by companies in non-regulated regions, and ensuring compliance and 
enforcement. 
The favourite instrument to address competitiveness issues, at least in the EU, has so far been 
the free allocation of allowances to installations that are subject to international 
competition.13  From an economic point of view, the effectiveness of this measure is 
uncertain.  Free allocation does not change the value of allowances and should therefore not 
affect the behaviour of firms at the margin.  An allowance has the same opportunity cost 
whether it has to be purchased on the market or was received for free.  Free allocation may 
make a difference, though in the presence of transaction costs or firm-internal dynamics.  
Relocating factories is costly, particularly if unions and local stakeholders are involved, and 
may affect a firm’s standing in the home market. Perhaps demonstrating profitability 
(however achieved) is sufficient for managers to keep an installation open.  However, such 
short-term arguments become less convincing once a trading system has been operational for 
a few years. 
The final alternative to deal with competitiveness problems is border tax adjustments. This 
option is discussed for example by Brewer (2004) and Ismer and Neuhoff (2007).   
                                                           
12
 Vivid Economics (2008) and Michaelowa et al. (2008) provide a discussion of sectoral trading 
approaches. 
13
 Free allocation is also a way to obtain buy-in from industry and to compensate stranded assets 
created through abrupt regulatory change. In political economy terms this is a key reason why cap-and-
trade systems are easier to implement than a carbon tax. 
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4 Temporal design: “when” flexibility 
We start from the theoretical ideal of long commitment periods (section 3.1), before noting 
that a system with banking and borrowing between periods (section 3.2) can deliver largely 
the same benefits.  In the absence of banking and borrowing, other mechanisms may be 
considered to smooth prices and provide clearer longer-term signals which may enhance 
“when” flexibility.  These include setting reserve prices in allowance auctions to ensure prices 
do not fall too low (section 3.3), creating an “allowance reserve” to be deployed if prices rise 
too high (section 3.4), or deploying more rigid price ceilings and floors (section 3.5).  The 
advantages and disadvantages of each design feature are considered. 
4.1 Commitment period length 
Section 2.2 noted that banking and borrowing are often permitted (at least to some extent) 
within but not necessarily between commitment periods.14  For instance, in the EU ETS, there 
is full banking within a commitment period, because EUAs are valid throughout the 
commitment period, in addition to banking between periods (Article 13).  In contrast, there is 
only limited de facto borrowing within a commitment period, and no borrowing at all 
between commitment periods.  The de facto borrowing is made possible because operators 
are allocated their allowances for each year in February, but need to surrender units for the 
previous year on 30 April, so they can effectively borrow one year ahead. Furthermore, as 
increasingly higher proportions of allowances are auctioned, even this limited de facto 
borrowing within periods will be effectively phased out. 
When there are limits on banking or borrowing between periods, longer commitment periods 
allow greater temporal flexibility, smoothing prices, reducing costs and increasing liquidity.  
For instance, a single 10-year commitment period is equivalent to two 5-year commitment 
periods where: 
― banking and borrowing between the two periods is allowed; and  
― the second period cap is pre-announced and is credible. 
 
                                                           
14
 It is important to draw the distinction between the “commitment period” (for instance 2008-2012 in 
the current Phase II) and the “compliance period”, which is annually under the EU ETS where firms 
have to submit the appropriate number of EUAs (or other recognised unit) to cover their emissions for 
the previous year on 30 April.  Our discussion focuses on the length of commitment periods rather than 
compliance periods. 
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Longer periods not only maximise “when” flexibility, they also reduce price volatility, and 
provide the private sector with longer-term price signals which, if credible, should spur 
innovation and investment.  However, longer periods reduce policymakers’ flexibility to 
adjust targets in response to changing science or new abatement technologies.  Different 
trading systems have struck the balance between these objectives in noticeably different 
ways. 
For instance, in the EU ETS, Phase I was a three year commitment period, with no banking or 
borrowing between Phase I and II.  While the scheme did appear to stimulate emission 
reductions (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007), three years was too short, even for a “learning 
phase”.  The Phase II commitment period is five years which is still arguably too short, 
although as noted banking to Phase III is permitted.  Phase III has an eight years period, which 
appears to be better matched with the relevant investment cycle, although firms are still 
faced with considerable uncertainty at the end of the 8-year Phase III period in 2020, unless 
Phase IV is negotiated well in advance.  This is the case even though the Commission has 
stated that the annual reduction in the cap during Phase III would be extended into Phase IV. 
In contrast, the Waxman-Markey draft bill sets out long-term reduction targets through to 
2050, providing greater clarity to investors on the time profile of abatement.  Allowances are 
to be reduced each year so that aggregate emissions under the system are reduced by 3% 
below 2005 levels in 2012, 20% in 2020, 42% in 2030, and 83% in 2050 (Section 702).  
Alongside these long-term targets are unlimited banking and limited effective borrowing, 
discussed further in section 4.2 below, generating long-term signals with significant “when” 
flexibility for firms.  However, the bill also provides some flexibility for government: the US 
National Academy of Sciences is required to submit a report every four years on the state of 
climate science, the “technological feasibility of achieving additional reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions”, and an analysis of worldwide efforts (Section 705) and thus make 
recommendations about making additional reductions.   
The proposed Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (“CPRS”) provides a different 
model of how to address this balance between long-term price signaling and policy flexibility 
(Government of Australia, 2008).  The CPRS provides firms with a certain emissions cap for 
five years into the future, with a “gateway”, or range of potential emissions caps covering the 
next ten years, as shown in Figure 4.  Each year, the five-year cap and the ten-year gateway 
are updated, so that at any given point in time the private sector has 15 years of an indicative 
range of cuts and 5 years of a defined cap.  The use of rolling commitment period that is 
updated annually avoids the sharp uncertainty between periods from which the EU ETS 
suffers. 
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Figure 4 Caps and gateways in the Australian CPRS 
 
Source: Government of Australia (2008) 
4.2 Banking and borrowing 
The end of a commitment period provides the real risk of a price crash or spike if participants 
are unable to bank and borrow allowances respectively.  Without banking, if the market is 
slightly over-allocated (as in EU ETS Phase I), then the marginal allowance is worthless and the 
price will collapse to zero (as it did).  Without borrowing, if the market is slightly under-
allocated, then the value of the marginal allowance could spike to the penalty plus expected 
price in the next phase (unless there are quick-to-implement abatement options that can be 
deployed fast once the under-allocation becomes known).   
Banking and borrowing may also increase the scope for the government to softly and credibly 
manage carbon prices so that they remain within a particular window.  Newell, Pizer and 
Zhang (2005) note that in a multi-period system with banking and borrowing, prices could be 
managed by agreeing that the stringency of targets in the next period automatically depend 
upon the revealed price in the current period. 
There are several even more significant advantages to banking, and very few drawbacks, 
which is why banking is now a widely adopted feature of emissions trading systems.  As 
noted, banking would have prevented the price crash observed in Phase I of the EU ETS, and 
indeed it is probably also playing a role in supporting prices in the current Phase II.  Banking 
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has several further advantages, namely that it: 
― effectively increases the depth and liquidity of the market, reducing price volatility by 
making current prices a function of a longer time span of activity, rather than being 
entirely determined by events today; 
― creates an incentive for firms to take early action to reduce emissions; 
― creates a private sector group with a vested interest in the success of the system, 
including an incentive to ensure rigorous monitoring and enforcement, as well as 
tight future targets, to protect and maximise the value of their carbon assets. 
 
Borrowing also enhances “when” flexibility and would also be likely to reduce price volatility.  
However, in contrast to banking, unlimited borrowing has some significant drawbacks, noted 
in section 2.2, namely that:  
― the government may not be well-equipped to assess the credit worthiness and 
solvency of firms who borrow allowances, thereby becoming debtors.  The usual 
mechanisms, such as the provision of collateral, may be deployed to mitigate this risk, 
but this would add transaction costs and complexity; 
― firms which are least solvent are likely to want to borrow more than firms which are 
most solvent (a form of adverse selection); 
― borrowing allows firms to delay action if they believe that targets will prove too 
onerous and will subsequently be softened; 
― firms with borrowed allowances have an active interest to lobby for weaker targets, 
or even for scrapping emissions trading altogether, so that their debts are reduced or 
cancelled (a form of moral hazard). 
 
For these reasons, borrowing is currently limited, and is likely to remain so.  In the EU ETS, 
borrowing is restricted to a de facto interest free loan of one year’s allowances (noted in 
section 4.1 above), which is effectively being phased out as auctioning is brought in. After 
2012, the EU ETS has retained the option of moving forward the auctioning of allowances 
from future years if market prices rise too high, providing the potential for a further form of 
borrowing within a given commitment period.   
Similarly, in the Waxman-Markey draft bill, rolling two-year compliance periods effectively 
allow operators to borrow one year ahead at a zero interest rate.  However, the Waxman-
Markey draft bill goes further than the EU ETS, and allowances from two to five years into the 
future can be borrowed (at an unspecified positive interest rate), up to a limit of 15% of the 
total obligation.   
Differences in banking and borrowing provisions do not preclude links between systems, but 
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they may pose important obstacles.  Systems with borrowing have risks to their 
environmental effectiveness if an operator borrows allowances and goes bankrupt before 
they are repaid.  If this were a significant concern, one solution proposed is to limit purchases 
to allowances found ex post to be surplus to emissions in a compliance period from firms who 
have not borrowed (Haites and Mullins, 2001).  Similarly, linking of one system with banking 
to another system with banking effectively creates a banking option for the system without 
banking. 
4.3 Auction reserve prices 
In the absence of long commitment periods and banking or borrowing, governments may 
seek other mechanisms to minimise price volatility and to increase the dynamic efficiency of 
the carbon market.  Governments may wish to provide support to carbon prices to ensure 
that firms continue to have an incentive to reduce emissions (this section), or may want to 
ensure prices do not rise too high (section 4.4), or establish more rigid price ceilings or floors 
(section 4.5). 
As the proportion of allowances allocated by auction increases, one “soft” approach to 
managing the risk of low carbon prices15 is to set a reserve (or minimum) price for the 
periodic auction of the allowances, such that no allowances would be sold onto the market if 
the reserve price was not reached (Hepburn et al, 2006).  Auctions would need to occur at 
various points over the commitment period, as indeed is planned, rather than auctioning all 
of the allowances upfront.  Firms would not buy allowances at the auction if market prices 
were below the reserve price, so the reserve price would serve to reduce the supply of 
allowances onto the market when prices were below the reserve price.  If a large enough 
proportion of allowances were auctioned, forward-looking market participants would 
anticipate a reduction in supply in the event of low prices, and adjust expectations so that 
market prices would be more likely to remain at or around the auction reserve price. 
The logic of the approach is shown in Figure 5.  In a market without auctions, participants are 
provided with free allocations up to quantity QCap, at which point the supply curve has a 
                                                           
15
 There is nothing wrong with very low carbon prices provided emission targets are being met and 
those targets have been set optimally.  On the contrary, under those circumstances low prices should 
be welcomed.  However, low prices are problematic if they reflect a suboptimally designed cap for a 
given commitment period, and imply much higher carbon prices in subsequent periods,  Fluctuating 
prices between periods does not promote “when” flexibility or dynamic efficiency, and mechanisms to 
smooth prices between periods would contribute to rectifying this problem.  
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vertical component.  Further allowances are supplied through flexible mechanisms, such as 
the CDM or JI.  Market prices are determined as usual at the intersection of demand and 
supply, which in the Figure happens to be on the SCDMJI portion of the curve.  In contrast, in a 
market with auctions and a reserve price, the free allocation is reduced, and the supply curve 
is horizontal at the auction reserve price.  The intersection of demand and supply could 
produce market prices above or below this reserve price, but the reserve price makes lower 
prices considerably less likely, particularly as the proportion of auctioned allowances 
increases. 
Figure 5 Auction reserve prices may provide price support 
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Source: Hepburn et al. (2006) 
There is no inherent reason why systems with and without auction reserve prices cannot be 
linked together.  However, there are several relevant considerations.  First, the effectiveness 
of an auction reserve price in one system will be muted if it is linked to another system 
without a reserve price (or with substantial free allocation).  Second, if linked market prices 
fall below the reserve price, the government of the system with the reserve price is obliged to 
curtail its supply of liquidity, thereby forfeiting the auction revenue to prop up prices in the 
linked system. This effectively constitutes a transfer of wealth from the system with the 
reserve price to the system without it.  In other words, just as linking systems together 
requires a similarity in ambition to minimise overall transfers from one system to another, the 
two systems would need to have similar (but not necessarily identical) auction reserve prices 
in order for linking to be successful. 
4.4 Allowance reserves 
Just as very low carbon prices may be problematic, so too are very high carbon prices.  Very 
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low prices in a given commitment period might suggest that the scheme design does not 
reflect the dynamically efficient path. Very high carbon prices in a given period may also 
reflect poor system design and dynamic inefficiency.  Where borrowing from a future 
commitment period is not feasible, some other mechanism to smooth prices may be 
desirable. 
Establishing an “allowance reserve” as contemplated by the Waxman-Markey draft bill 
(Section 726), could provide a “soft” mechanism by which to manage the risk of excessively 
high carbon prices.  The economics of an allowance reserve are not dissimilar to that of a 
“safety valve” or “price ceiling” (section 4.5), as shown in Figure 6 below.  With a “price 
ceiling” (left figure), the emissions cap creates the vertical component of the supply curve 
(marked “f”), while the safety valve creates the horizontal component (marked “g”), because 
additional allowances are supplied elastically onto the market at the fixed ceiling price.   
An allowance reserve (right figure) is like a safety valve where a limit is placed on the number 
of allowances that will be issued if the safety valve is triggered.  This ensures that the system 
delivers a defined level of emission reductions.  Murray et al. (2008) provide a clear 
exposition of the merits of an allowance reserve. 
Figure 6 Allowance reserves provide a limited form of cost containment 
 
Source: Murray et al. (2008) 
There are no economic impediments that prevent a system without an allowance reserve 
from linking to a system with an allowance reserve.  However, an allowance reserve, once 
triggered, effectively transfers wealth from the system without the reserve to the system 
with the reserve.  This is the converse of the wealth transfers potentially involved with an 
auction reserve price: withholding allowances from the market would transfer wealth from 
the system with the auction reserve price to the system without.   
Fankhauser and Hepburn  Carbon markets in space and time 
24 
In practice, these wealth transfers may create political difficulties unless (i) the levels of 
ambition of the two systems are set to allow for this possibility; or (ii) both systems introduce 
allowance reserves of roughly similar size.   
4.5 Price ceilings and price floors 
If commitment periods are short (section 4.1), banking and borrowing is limited or 
impermissible (section 4.2), there is no auction price reserve (section 4.3) or allowance 
reserve (section 4.4), then prices will probably be highly volatile and subject to damaging 
spikes and/or crashes.  The trading system will be unlikely to send appropriate long-term 
signals to private actors, who are therefore unlikely to seek to minimise their costs through 
“when” flexibility. 
In circumstances such as these, consideration may be given to the establishment of a “price 
collar”, outside of which carbon prices would not be permitted to move.  The price collar 
could be implemented by a “hybrid instrument” which is a carefully tailored combination of 
price and quantity instruments.16  Such a hybrid instrument would make the trading scheme 
more “price like”, which is likely to improve the economic efficiency of the system under 
uncertainty for a long-term stock problem such as climate change, as noted in the 
Introduction to this report.  Establishing a price ceiling and floor would provide significantly 
greater clarity to investors to deliver dynamic efficiency (in the form of optimal investment 
over longer timeframes).  The price floor would guarantee a certain minimum return on 
investment in low-carbon technologies, reducing the risk faced by innovating firms.  
Additionally, the price ceiling may enhance policy credibility.  Because it caps the costs of 
compliance, a ceiling reduces the risk of a policy reversal if abatement costs turn out to be 
injuriously high.   
The price ceiling could be established through an unlimited commitment from government 
(or the regulating body) to sell allowances onto the market at the price ceiling.17  A ceiling 
                                                           
16
 Hybrid instruments should be distinguished from the use of multiple instruments for the one 
problem (see section 3.6).  Hybrid instruments have generated much interest in the climate change 
context, see e.g. Pizer (2002) and Jacoby and Ellerman (2004).  The classic paper is Roberts and Spence 
(1976). 
17
 Note that a penalty for non-compliance does not constitute a price ceiling unless it serves to release 
firms from the obligation to comply. For instance, although the European emissions trading scheme 
imposes penalties for non-compliance for Phase I and II of €40/tCO2 and €100/tCO2 respectively, excess 
emissions must also be offset in the following compliance period (European Commission, 2003). 
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would be achieved, however, at the cost of sacrificing compliance with the emissions cap.  In 
addition to compromising the environmental objective of the system, breaching the 
emissions cap might create difficulties when nations participating in the trading system are 
subject to international emission reduction obligations.  The price floor might be established 
through an unlimited commitment from government (or the regulating body) to buy back 
allowances from the market at the price floor.  The floor would be achieved at the risk of 
imposing a liability on the public balance sheet.  If prices fall, the cost of buying allowances to 
support prices would be borne by the taxpayer, with particularly unappealing distributional 
consequences if the allowances had been freely allocated to firms in the first place. 
In addition to these problems with price ceilings and floors, a key problem in adopting price 
ceilings and floors is that they create additional complexity in linking of systems together, and 
may even prevent linkage, reducing “where” flexibility. Ceilings and floors make linking 
systems considerably more complex, because relevant regions and nation-states would need 
to agree upon the price ceiling and/or price floor, in addition to a mechanism for 
implementing them.  Müller, Michaelowa and Vrolijk (2001) express the view that achieving 
agreement on this would be a ‘political nightmare’. 
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5 Conclusion 
There are compelling reasons to establish a long-term ambition for a global carbon market.  
We have defined the ‘global carbon market’ not in the sense of a globally administered and 
regulated trading regime, but in the sense of a mosaic of regional and national markets that 
are linked and whose level of ambition is consistent with the overarching aims of climate 
change policy.  National or regional carbon markets may be linked directly (presumably with 
import limits) or indirectly through common products like CERs or forest offsets that are 
accepted in all systems. 
The current flurry of national and regional initiatives to set up carbon markets is a welcome 
opportunity for experimentation and innovation, allowing the opportunity to explore 
different designs. But there is also a risk that the results will create incompatibilities that limit 
the potential for linking and result in a fragmented global market in which the benefits of 
“where” flexibility are not fully explored.  
There is merit in experimentation and learning.  The concept of emissions trading is not new 
(Dales, 1968), and nor is the practice of emissions trading, but carbon markets on the scale, 
ambition and planetary importance of those currently emerging have never been seen 
before.  We do not yet have all the answers on how these carbon markets should be designed 
and implemented.  For example, the experience with phase I of the EU ETS has resulted in 
important lessons on auctioning, banking and information release that have now been 
incorporated in the design of subsequent systems.  Experience with RGGI has also been 
enlightening.  Continued innovation generates valuable lessons. 
However, the right balance has to be found between experimentation and the need to make 
systems compatible so that they can eventually be linked up. The gains from trade (section 
3.1) from linking are potentially enormous, even if the linked systems have identical 
estimated ambition (and hence carbon price) ex ante.  Design features that may generate 
political or economic obstacles to linking include: differences of ambition, treatment of free 
allocation vs auctioning, price management policies (including price ceilings, price floors, 
allowance reserves, auction reserve prices), rules on borrowing, and treatment of offsets.  
While design differences along these dimensions do not necessarily prevent linking, they 
contribute to increased economic issues, design problems or political concerns about 
financial flows from one system to the other. 
In terms of “when” flexibility, there are four key conclusions.  First, the trend towards longer 
commitment periods is to be welcomed, as isolated three or five year periods are too short.  
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Beyond ten years, the trade-off between a committed, clear long-term price signal for the 
private sector, and the flexibility for policy (and emission targets) to respond to changes in 
the science or abatement costs becomes more challenging.  Different approaches – such as 
the Australian CPRS – may yield interesting insights in this respect.   
Second, banking both within and between commitment periods has several advantages, and 
it comes as no surprise that new systems are adopting liberal banking rules.   
Third, borrowing carries significant drawbacks by way of moral hazard and adverse selection 
concerns, and should only be permitted in a relatively limited manner, as indeed both the EU 
ETS and the Waxman-Markey draft bill anticipate.  The limited differences in banking or 
borrowing rules that currently exist should not create major problems for linking systems.  
Fourth, other price management policies, such as allowance reserves, auction reserve prices 
or hard price ceilings and/or floors, could be potential policy options to reduce price variance 
between commitment periods and increase dynamic efficiency and “when” flexibility.  
However, these policies create obstacles that will make linking much more difficult. Given 
that dynamic efficiency should be achievable in systems with long enough commitment 
periods and appropriate banking and borrowing, these additional interventions may be seen 
as second-best policy alternatives to setting appropriate long-term targets in systems with 
banking and limited borrowing.   
Some of these design issues create conceptual difficulties and barriers to linking developed 
country systems. To some extent, there is a trade-off between “where” and “when” 
flexibility. Figure 1 above shows that the gains from spatial flexibility dominate those from 
temporal flexibility, suggesting that policy makers should be willing to compromise on the 
latter to secure the former.  However, much of the benefits from spatial flexibility come from 
trading with developing countries (that is, the extended use of offsets), rather than linking 
developed country systems.  This would speak against linkages that are achieved at the price 
of tighter limits on offsets. 
The main design features that create barriers to the linking of systems are the rules on 
banking and borrowing and the presence of price control mechanisms if they underpin 
diverging views about the appropriate level of ambition (and hence prices).  However, few of 
them constitute an insurmountable obstacle to linking developed country systems and 
advancing towards an overall long-run objective of establishing a global carbon market to 
reduce emissions.  While there are factors discussed in this report that counsel against full 
liberalisation of markets across space and time, taking advantage of “when” and “where” 
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flexibility is critical to minimising the costs of mitigating emissions and responding to climate 
change.   
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